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We present a quantum protocol for the task of weak coin flipping. We find that, for one choice
of parameters in the protocol, the maximum probability of a dishonest party winning the coin flip
if the other party is honest is 1/
√
2. We also show that if parties restrict themselves to strategies
wherein they cannot be caught cheating, their maximum probability of winning can be even smaller.
As such, the protocol offers additional security in the form of cheat sensitivity.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
In 1981 Blum[1] introduced the following crypto-
graphic problem: Alice and Bob have just divorced and
are trying to determine who will keep the car. They
agree to decide the issue by the flip of a coin, but they can
only communicate by telephone. The question is whether
there is a protocol that allows them to decide on a winner
in such a way that both parties feel secure that the other
cannot fix the outcome.
Two-party protocols, of which this is an example, are
some of the most problematic in classical cryptography.
In fact, there are no two-party classical protocols whose
security does not rely upon assumptions (many of which
are threatened by quantum computation) about the com-
plexity of a computational task. Kilian explains [2]:
[In a two-party protocol] both parties possess
the entire transcript of the conversation that
has taken place between them. [. . . ] Because
of this knowledge symmetry condition there
are impossibility proofs for seemingly trivial
problems. Cryptographic protocols “cheat”
by setting up situations in which A may de-
termine exactly what B can infer about her
data, from an information theoretic point of
view, but does not know what he can easily
(i.e. in probabilistic polynomial time) infer
about her data. From an information the-
oretic point of view, of course, nothing has
been accomplished.(emphasis added)
Conversely, when we move from classical to quantum
cryptography, we find many two-party protocols whose
security rests only upon the validity of quantum mechan-
ics. Thus, from a quantum information-theoretic point
of view, something significant can be accomplished. Fur-
thermore, quantum protocols can naturally exhibit a type
of security known as cheat sensitivity [3]: whenever a
party cheats above some threshold amount, he or she
runs a risk of being caught. This can provide a strong
deterrent to cheating. For instance, if two parties need
to implement a protocol many times, they may stand to
gain more from the preservation of the trust of the other
party than they do from cheating in a single implementa-
tion. Such considerations can be treated quantitatively
by assigning numerical costs to the various possible re-
sults. Given the striking contrasts between what can be
accomplished in classical and quantum two-party proto-
cols, the analysis of such protocols provides valuable in-
sights into the differences between classical and quantum
information theory.
In this letter, we will be concerned with a crypto-
graphic task called coin flipping. We begin by distin-
guishing a strong and a weak form, both of which are
adequate for Blum’s original problem.
Strong Coin Flipping(SCF): Alice and Bob engage in
some number of rounds of communication, at the end
of which each infers the outcome of the protocol to be
either 0, 1, or fail. If both are honest then they agree on
the outcome and find it to be 0 or 1 with equal probabil-
ity. Suppose, on the other hand, that one of the parties,
X , is dishonest. In this situation, X cannot increase
the probability of his/her opponent obtaining the out-
come c to greater than 1/2 + ǫcX , for either c = 0 or
c = 1. The parameters ǫ0A, ǫ
1
A, ǫ
0
B, ǫ
1
B, which specify the
degree to which the protocol resists biasing, must each
be strictly less than 1/2.
Weak Coin Flipping(WCF): This is simply SCF without
any constraints on ǫ0A or ǫ
1
B. The parameters ǫA ≡ ǫ1A
and ǫB ≡ ǫ0B must be strictly less than 1/2 and specify
the bias-resistance of the protocol.
An SCF protocol ensures that neither party can fix the
outcome to be 0 or fix the outcome to be 1. This proto-
col is appropriate when the parties do not know which
outcome their opponent favors. By contrast, a WCF pro-
tocol only ensures that Alice cannot fix the outcome to
be 1 and that Bob cannot fix the outcome to be 0. This
is appropriate if Alice and Bob are playing a game where
Alice wins if the outcome is 1 and Bob wins if the out-
come is 0.
It has been shown by Lo and Chau [4] that a perfectly
bias-resistant SCF protocol, i.e. one having ǫ0,1A,B = 0, is
2impossible. Recently, Kitaev [5] has shown that it is also
impossible to find an arbitrarily bias-resistant SCF pro-
tocol, i.e. one for which ǫ0,1A,B → 0 in the limit that some
security parameters go to infinity. The first partially bias-
resistant SCF protocol, presented by Aharonov et al.[6],
had ǫ0,1B ≃ 0.354 and ǫ0,1A ≤ 0.414. We later showed that
ǫ0,1A = ǫ
0,1
B [7]. If ǫ
c
A = ǫ
c
B for c = 0 and 1, we call the
protocol fair ; if ǫ0X = ǫ
1
X for X = A and B, we call it bal-
anced. A fair and balanced SCF protocol with ǫ0,1A,B =
1
4
was recently discovered by Ambainis [8]; the possibility
of SCF with this degree of security also follows from our
analysis [9] of quantum bit commitment. In fact, the re-
sults of Ref. [9] imply the existence of a balanced SCF
protocol with ǫ0,1A = α and ǫ
0,1
B = β for any pair of values
α, β satisfying α+ β = 1/2.
Much less is known about WCF. Indeed, whether arbi-
trarily bias-resistant WCF is possible or not remains an
open question. Since an SCF protocol yields a WCF pro-
tocol with parameters ǫA = ǫ
0
A and ǫB = ǫ
1
B, the protocol
of Ref. [9] yields a WCF protocol with ǫA + ǫB = 1/2.
However, it is likely that by making a SCF protocol un-
balanced one can lower the values of ǫ1A and ǫ
0
B at the
expense of ǫ0A and ǫ
1
B. Thus, one would expect there to
exist a WCF protocol with better security than the one
derived from Ref. [9]. This expectation is borne out by
the results of this letter. Specifically, we demonstrate
the existence of a three-round WCF protocol for any ǫA,
ǫB satisfying (1/2 + ǫA)(1/2 + ǫB) = 1/2. In particular,
this implies that there exists a fair WCF protocol with
ǫA,B = (
√
2− 1)/2 ≃ 0.207.
We also characterize the cheat sensitivity of this pro-
tocol. Specifically, we consider each party’s threshold for
cheat sensitivity, defined as the maximum probability of
winning that the party can achieve while ensuring that
his or her probability of being caught cheating remains
strictly zero. Since a party can achieve a probability
of winning of 1/2 without cheating, the minimum possi-
ble threshold is 1/2. The maximum possible threshold is
simply the party’s maximum probability of winning. The
protocol is only said to be cheat-sensitive if the threshold
is less than this maximum value. We find that for suit-
ably chosen parameters, the protocol presented here can
be cheat-sensitive against both parties simultaneously.
Although no parameter choices yield a threshold of 1/2
for both parties simultaneously, it is possible to obtain
such a threshold for one of the parties.
The protocol:
Round 1. Alice prepares a pair of systems in a (typically
entangled) state |ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB, and sends system B to
Bob.
Round 2. Bob performs the measurement associated with
the positive operator-valued measure (POVM) {E0, E1}
on system B, and sends a classical bit b indicating the
result to Alice.
Round 3. If b = 0 then Bob sends system B back
to Alice, while if b = 1 then Alice sends system A
to Bob. The party that receives the system then per-
forms the measurement associated with the projection
valued measure {|ψb〉〈ψb|, I − |ψb〉〈ψb|}, where |ψb〉 =
I⊗√Eb |ψ〉 /
√
〈ψ| I ⊗ Eb |ψ〉. The different possible out-
comes are:
(i) b = 0, Alice finds |ψ0〉 〈ψ0|; Bob wins.
(ii) b = 0, Alice finds I − |ψ0〉 〈ψ0|; Alice catches Bob
cheating.
(iii) b = 1, Bob finds |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|; Alice wins.
(iv) b = 1, Bob finds I − |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|; Bob catches Alice
cheating.
Notice that unlike other proposed two-party protocols,
at no stage does this protocol require either party to
make classical random choices. While this protocol is
sufficient for WCF, it is insufficient for SCF because
Bob can always choose to lose by simply announcing
b = 1. We will see that one can characterize an instance
of the protocol completely by specifying the POVM ele-
ment E0 and the reduced density operator on system B,
ρ ≡ TrA(|ψ〉 〈ψ|). In order for the parties to have equal
probabilities of winning when both are honest, the con-
straint Tr (ρE0) = 1/2 must be satisfied. This implies, in
particular, that |ψb〉 =
√
2
(
I ⊗√Eb |ψ〉
)
.
We proceed by listing the most important properties of
the protocol. We then present several interesting specific
choices of E0 and ρ. The proofs are left until the end.
Property 1: Alice’s maximum probability of winning is
PmaxA = 2Tr
(
ρE20
)
Property 2: Alice’s threshold for cheat sensitivity is
P threshA =
1
2Tr
(
ρΠ(I−E0)
) ,
where ΠX denotes the projector onto the support of X
(the support of X is the set of eigenvectors of X associ-
ated with non-zero eigenvalues).
Property 3: Bob’s maximum probability of winning is
PmaxB = 2(Tr
√
ρE0ρ)
2,
Property 4: Bob’s threshold for cheat sensitivity is
P threshB =
1
2λmax (E0Πρ)
,
where λmax(X) denotes the largest eigenvalue of X .
An interesting family of protocols is defined by the
choices ρ = x|0〉〈0| + (1 − x)|1〉〈1| and E0 = 12x |0〉〈0|,
where 1/2 < x ≤ 1. For these protocols, PmaxA =
1/2x, PmaxB = x, P
thresh
A = 1/2, P
thresh
B = P
max
B . Thus
Alice runs a risk of being caught whenever she cheats,
while Bob can cheat up to the maximum amount possible
without running any risk of being caught. This family
achieves the trade-off
PmaxA P
max
B = 1/2. (1)
3It is easy to prove that this trade-off is optimal when
E0 and ρ have support in a 2-d Hilbert space. In a
preprint version of this letter, we conjectured that it was
optimal for all higher dimensional Hilbert spaces as well.
Subsequently, this was proven by Ambainis [10] (who also
independently discovered a WCF protocol achieving the
trade-off of Eq.(1)). It is interesting to note that whereas
the best known SCF protocols [8, 9] require a qutrit for
their implementation, a qubit suffices here.
A second interesting family of protocols is defined
by the choices ρ = x|0〉〈0| + (1 − x)|1〉〈1| and E0 =
(1 − 12x )|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|, with 1/2 ≤ x < 1. For these,
PmaxA = 1/2x, P
max
B = 2+4x
2−5x+2(1−x)
√
2x(2x− 1),
P threshA = P
max
A , P
thresh
B = 1/2. In contrast with the
previous example, Bob now runs a risk of being caught
whenever he cheats, while Alice can cheat up to the max-
imum amount possible without running any risk of being
caught. The trade-off (1) is no longer attained however.
It can be shown that no choice of E0 and ρ can give
P threshA = P
thresh
B = 1/2 [11]. Nonetheless, it is possible
to have P threshA < P
max
A and P
thresh
B < P
max
B , i.e., cheat
sensitivity against both parties simultaneously. This oc-
curs, for example, when ρ = 12I and E0 =
3
4 |0〉〈0| +
1
4 |1〉〈1|, since in this case PmaxA = 5/8, P threshA = 1/2,
PmaxB =
1
2 +
√
3
4 ≃ 0.933, and P threshB = 2/3. In this case,
if the parties restrict themselves to strategies wherein
they cannot be caught cheating, their maximum proba-
bility of winning is even less than 1/
√
2. This example
demonstrates that cheat sensitivity is a useful form of
security in its own right.
Proof of Property 1: Assume that Bob is honest.
Alice’s most general cheating strategy is to prepare a
state |ψ′〉 instead of the honest |ψ〉 . (It is obvious from
what follows that she gains no advantage by preparing
a mixed state, and thus no advantage by implement-
ing strategies wherein she performs measurements on
A or entangles A with a system she keeps in her pos-
session. Moreover, since she only submits A to Bob
when b = 1, any operation on A she wishes to per-
form can be done prior to Bob’s announcement, and
thus can be incorporated into the preparation.) The
probability that Bob obtains the outcome b = 1 is
〈ψ′| I ⊗ E1 |ψ′〉 , and the probability that Alice passes
Bob’s test for |ψ1〉 when she resubmits system A is
|〈ψ1|ψ′1〉|2 , where |ψ′b〉 ≡ (I⊗
√
Eb|ψ′〉)/
√
〈ψ′|I ⊗ Eb|ψ′〉.
Alice only wins the coin flip if the outcome is b = 1
and she passes Bob’s test. This occurs with probability
PA = 〈ψ′| I⊗E1 |ψ′〉 |〈ψ1|ψ′1〉|2 = |〈ψ1|I⊗
√
E1|ψ′〉|2.We
wish to find PmaxA ≡ sup|ψ′〉 PA. Thus, we must max-
imize the overlap of a normalized vector |ψ′〉, with the
non-normalized vector I⊗√E1|ψ1〉. Clearly, this is done
by taking the two vectors parallel, so the optimal |ψ′〉 is
|ψ′max〉 = (I ⊗√E1|ψ1〉
)
/
√
〈ψ1|I ⊗ E1|ψ1〉. Using the
definition of |ψ1〉 and applying some straightforward al-
gebra, we find PmaxA = 2Tr(ρE
2
1 ). As E
2
1 = (I − E0)2 we
obtain PmaxA = 2Tr(ρE
2
0 ). 
Proof of Property 2: We seek to determine Alice’s
maximum probability of winning assuming that her prob-
ability of being caught cheating is strictly zero. Alice’s
most general cheating strategy is, as above, to prepare
a pure state |ψ′〉 . She must pass Bob’s test with proba-
bility one, which implies |〈ψ1|ψ′1〉|2 = 1, or |ψ′1〉 = |ψ1〉
to within a phase factor. Multiplying both sides of this
latter equation by I ⊗ √E1−1 (we use X−1 to denote
the inverse of X on its support), and writing |ψ′1〉 and
|ψ1〉 in terms of |ψ′〉 and |ψ〉 , we obtain I ⊗ ΠE1 |ψ′〉 =
α (I ⊗ΠE1 |ψ〉) for some constant α. It follows that
|ψ′〉 = α (I ⊗ΠE1 |ψ〉) + β |χ〉 , where I ⊗ ΠE1 |χ〉 = 0
and α, β are constrained to ensure that |ψ′〉 is normal-
ized. Heuristically, Alice can pass Bob’s test with prob-
ability 1 whenever she submits a state |ψ′〉 that is indis-
tinguishable from |ψ〉 within the support of E1. Alice’s
probability of winning in this case is 〈ψ′| I ⊗ E1 |ψ′〉 =
|α|2 〈ψ| I ⊗ E1 |ψ〉 = 12 |α|2 , which is maximized when
β = 0 and α = 1/
√
〈ψ| I ⊗ΠE1 |ψ〉. This yields P threshA =
1/2 〈ψ| I ⊗ΠE1 |ψ〉 = 1/2Tr (ρΠE1) . 
For proving properties 3 and 4, the following definition
and lemma are useful. (For simplicity we ignore degener-
acy and support issues which are easily incorporated but
do not change any of our results.)
Definition: Consider a vector |ϕ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, a linear
operator X on HA and a linear operator Y on HB. X
and Y are said to be Schmidt equivalent under |ϕ〉 if the
matrix elements of X in the eigenbasis of TrB (|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|) ,
are the same as the matrix elements of Y in the eigenbasis
of TrA (|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|) .
Lemma [7]: For a vector |ϕ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, and a positive
operator E on HB,
TrB
((
I ⊗
√
E
)
|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|
(
I ⊗
√
E
))
=
√
ωDT
√
ω,
where ω ≡ TrB (|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|), D is the operator on HA that
is Schmidt equivalent to E under |ϕ〉 , and DT is the
transpose of D with respect to the eigenbasis of ω.
Proof of lemma: Suppose the bi-orthogonal de-
composition of |ϕ〉 is |ϕ〉 = ∑j
√
λj |ej〉 ⊗ |fj〉 .
Taking the trace in terms of the basis {|fi〉} , we
find LHS =
∑
j,k
√
λjλk |ej〉 〈fk|E |fj〉 〈ek| . By def-
inition, 〈fk|E |fj〉 = 〈ek|D |ej〉 and 〈ek|D |ej〉 =
〈ej |DT |ek〉 . With some re-ordering of terms, we obtain
LHS = (
∑
j
√
λj |ej〉 〈ej|)DT (
∑
k
√
λk |ek〉 〈ek|). Noting
that
√
λj and |ej〉 are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
of
√
ω, we have the desired result. 
Proof of Property 3: Assume that Alice is honest.
Bob’s most general cheating strategy can be implemented
as follows. First, he performs a measurement on system
B of a POVM {E′k} , which may have an arbitrary num-
ber of outcomes. With probability p′k = 〈ψ| I⊗E′k |ψ〉 the
outcome is k and the state of the total system is updated
to |ψ′k〉 =
(
I ⊗√E′k |ψ〉
)
/
√
p′k. After the measurement,
4Bob can perform a unitary transformation, Uk, on sys-
tem B, the nature of which depends on the outcome k
that was recorded. Finally, he must decide whether to
announce b = 0 or 1 based on the result of the measure-
ment, that is, he must decide on a set S0 of outcomes for
which he will announce b = 0.
Bob’s probability of passing Alice’s test given out-
come k is |〈ψ0| I ⊗ Uk |ψ′k〉|2, so his probability of win-
ning the coin flip is PB =
∑
k∈S0 p
′
k |〈ψ0| I ⊗ Uk |ψ′k〉|2 .
We must maximize this with respect to variations
in {E′k} , {Uk} , and S0. By Uhlmann’s theorem [12],
supUk |〈ψ0| I ⊗ Uk |ψ′k〉|
2
= F (σ0, σ
′
k)
2
, where σb ≡
TrB (|ψb〉 〈ψb|) , σ′k ≡ TrB (|ψ′k〉 〈ψ′k|) and F (ω, τ) ≡
Tr|√ω√τ | is the fidelity. Thus we need to compute
PmaxB = sup{E′k},S0
∑
k∈S0 F (σ0, p
′
kσ
′
k)
2
. Since the fi-
delity squared is always positive,
∑
k∈S0 F (σ0, p
′
kσ
′
k)
2 ≤∑
k F (σ0, p
′
kσ
′
k)
2
. This implies that the optimal S0 is
the entire set of indices: no matter what the outcome k
of Bob’s measurement, he should announce bit 0. More-
over, by the concavity of the fidelity squared [12], we
have
∑
k F (σ0, p
′
kσ
′
k)
2 ≤ F (σ0,
∑
k p
′
kσ
′
k)
2 = F (σ0, σ)
2
,
where σ ≡ TrB (|ψ〉 〈ψ|). This upper bound is satu-
rated if Bob makes no measurement upon system B.
Using the definition of |ψ0〉 and the lemma, we find
that σ0 = 2
√
σDT0
√
σ, where D0 is Schmidt equiva-
lent to E0 under |ψ〉 . Thus, we can write PmaxB =
F
(
2
√
σDT0
√
σ, σ
)2
= F (2
√
σD0
√
σ, σ)
2
, where the sec-
ond equality follows from the fact that XT and X have
the same eigenvalues. By the isomorphism between HA
and HB induced by Schmidt equivalence under |ψ〉, we
have PmaxB = F
(
2
√
ρE0
√
ρ, ρ
)2
. Finally, by the defini-
tion of the fidelity, we have PmaxB = 2(Tr
√
ρE0ρ)
2. 
Proof of Property 4: We seek to determine Bob’s max-
imum probability of winning assuming that his probabil-
ity of being caught cheating is strictly zero. The latter
condition constrains Bob’s most general cheating strat-
egy, described above, to be such that he must always
pass Alice’s test whenever he announces the outcome
b = 0. That is, we require that {E′k}, {Uk} and S0 be
such that I ⊗ Uk |ψ′k〉 = |ψ0〉 for all k ∈ S0. The prob-
ability that Bob wins the coin flip is simply
∑
k∈S0 p
′
k,
so we seek to determine sup{Uk},{E′k},S0
(∑
k∈S0 p
′
k
)
,
where the optimization is subject to the above con-
straint. We solve the optimization problem by es-
tablishing an upper bound and demonstrating that
it can be saturated. We begin by using the def-
initions of |ψ′k〉 and |ψ0〉 to rewrite the constraint
equation as 1
p′
k
(
I ⊗ Uk
√
E′k
) |ψ〉 〈ψ| (I ⊗ Uk
√
E′k
)
=
2
(
I ⊗√E0
) |ψ〉 〈ψ| (I ⊗√E0
)
Tracing over B and
applying the lemma provided above, we obtain√
σ(D′k)
T
√
σ = 2p′k
√
σDT0
√
σ, where D′k and D0 are
the Schmidt equivalent operators to E′k and E0 respec-
tively. It follows that ΠσD
′
kΠσ = 2p
′
kΠσD0Πσ,which,
by the isomorphism between HA and HB induced by
Schmidt equivalence under |ψ〉, implies ΠρE′kΠρ =
2p′kΠρE0Πρ. Combining this with
∑
k∈S0 E
′
k ≤ I, we ob-
tain
∑
k∈S0 2p
′
kΠρE0Πρ ≤ Πρ, which in turn implies that∑
k∈S0 p
′
k ≤ 1/2λmax (ΠρE0Πρ) = 1/2λmax (ΠρE0) . The
upper bound can be saturated while satisfying the con-
straint if Bob measures the POVM, {E′0, E′1} , defined by
E′0 = ΠρE0Πρ/λ
max (ΠρE0) , and announces b = 0 when
he obtains the outcome associated with E′0 [13]. Thus,
Bob’s threshold is P threshB = 1/2λ
max (ΠρE0) . 
The ordering of the authors on this paper was chosen
by a coin flip implemented by a trusted third party. TR
lost.
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